



**The Demographic
Transition—Some
Features and Effects**

Tim Dyson




a = beginning of the transition
 b = greatest difference between birth and death rates
 c = end of the transition


Netherlands




England and Wales




Spain




Taiwan




Egypt






Between 1750 and 2050 the ‘growth multiple’ of the human population is expected to be roughly **nine**. In Europe, populations increased by factors of two or three as they went through the transition. In China the factor will be about three or four. In India it may be about five. However, in many poor countries it will be anywhere between five and twenty—indeed, even higher growth multiples are possible.


Russia 1950




Nigeria 1950




Russia 1950




Nigeria 1950









Russia 2000




Nigeria 2000






The consequences of low and high fertility can be illustrated by a comparison of Russia and Nigeria over 1950-2050. Russia's population rose from 103 to 147 million, and even assuming some *recovery* in fertility it is projected to fall to 116m by 2050. The figures for Nigeria are 37m, 125m and 289m. Barring a meteorite hit, or a nuclear war, the *broad* picture shown is inevitable


Figure 5.2(a) Crude death and birth rates for urban and rural areas of Sweden, 1750-1960



4(a) Europe and Asia




4(b) Latin America and Africa



NOTE: See text and notes 26. 27 and 28.


‘Rapid population growth is found to have exercised a quantitatively important negative impact on the pace of aggregate economic growth in developing countries ... rapid fertility decline is found to make a quantitatively relevant contribution to reducing the incidence and severity of poverty’ (Birdsall and Sinding 2001: 6)

Figure 2 *Population Growth and Economic Growth, 1950-2000*



The main factor behind rapid *urban* growth in developing countries is rapid population growth. However, as Preston has observed: ‘Oddly, family planning services are rarely seen as a candidate for slowing urban growth’ (Preston 1979: 210-11)

The relationship between urban and total population growth rates, 111 countries, 2000-2005



Other things equal, population growth has an upward influence on CO₂ emissions—an effect that is *much* greater in rich countries than in poor countries (see Dyson 2005).

Population matters!

In many ways the demographic transition has been a *very* good thing.


But it also represents a period of considerable *destabilization*—at both the household and the national levels.

The provision of safe, effective, and affordable *contraception* is the main way of minimizing this destabilization. Contraception provides people with *choice*.

And all the evidence is that, given the possibility of making the choice, then eventually women and men *always* decide to take it.

ity Transition:

ion characterised by rural-urban mortality and fertility differentials:



3.3. The stylized urban demographic transition

DeVries, 1990)

nd of a mobility revolution, which is a key feature of the urban demographic transition.